

The Legacy of Representation in Medieval Europe for Incomes and Institutions Today[†]

Jamie Bologna Pavlik
Texas Tech University
Agricultural and Applied Economics
Free Market Institute
ph: 724-882-0074
em: jamie.bologna@ttu.edu

Andrew T. Young
Rawls College of Business
Texas Tech University
Lubbock, TX USA 79409
ph: 806 834 1374
em: a.t.young@ttu.edu

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Abstract: Why can some governments credibly commit to the rule of law and protection of property rights while others cannot? A potential answer involves deep historical traditions of institutions that constrain rulers. We explore whether experiences with representative assemblies in medieval/early modern Europe have left their mark on incomes and institutions today. We employ Stasavage's (2010) data on representative assembly activity in 30 medieval/early modern European polities and the Putterman and Weil (2010) data on descendency shares from circa 1500 populations to construct country-level measures of historical assembly experience. In a cross-country analysis, we find that assembly experience is positively and significantly correlated with current incomes, a measure of the rule of law and property rights, and the Polity IV index that emphasizes executive constraint. Once the latter two variables are controlled for, the estimated effect of assembly experience on current incomes is insignificant. However, the correlation between assembly experience and either institutional measure is robust to controlling for (among other variables) current income levels, 1500 income levels, human capital levels, and two different measures of general European influence.

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1. Introduction

Following the seminal contributions of North and Thomas (1973), North (1990) and those of other New Institutional Economists, a large literature emerged that linked the quality of institutions – “the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” (North 1990, p. 3) – to income levels and growth rates. The title of Rodrick et al.’s (2004) paper embodied the sentiment of many students of economic development: *institutions rule*. In particular, scholars emphasized the importance of property rights and the rule of law.¹

If today’s institutions do indeed rule for economic development, an important question remains: why are some countries’ governments able to credibly commit to the rule of law and protection of property rights while others are not? A potential answer to this question involves deep historical traditions of representative institutions that constrain rulers. For example, North and Weingast (1989) famously emphasize constitutional arrangements that emerged from England’s Glorious Revolution. They argued that those arrangements resulted in a Parliament that effectively checked the Crown’s ability to unilaterally confiscate property and default on its obligations. However, those constitutional arrangements were not created *ab nihilo*; rather, they were built upon medieval traditions of representative advice and consent granted (or withheld) on monarchs’ policies.² As such, scholars have noted that governance based on representative

¹ Examples include Knack and Keefer (1995), Barro (1996), Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002), Rodrick et al. (2004), and Acemoglu and Johnson (2005).

² Indeed, the North and Weingast (1989) thesis has, in its purest form, found itself at odds with historians arguing that the constitutional adjustments following the Glorious Revolution were conservative: they generally reestablished property rights in ways consistent with pre-Stuart times (e.g., Jones 1992; Morrill 1992; Scott 1991; Trevor-Roper 1992; Nenner 1992; Pincus 2009; Ogilvie and Carus 2014). Though he agrees with these critiques, Hodgson (2017) argues that while “North and Weingast claim[] that 1688 secured property rights led to the rise of finance; instead [...] the rise of finance stimulated the greater use of property as collateral for borrowing and financing investment” (p. 84), taking this to mean that the “evidence undermines the claims of North and others concerning the economic consequences of the Glorious Revolution [...] is a step too far [...] rather “1688 triggered a series of events that prepared the ground for the take-off [in economic growth] after 1760” (p. 92).

advice and consent developed initially in Europe; and they have sought to explain this fact (Stasavage 2016; the references cited therein).

Are deep historical European traditions of representative institutions foundational to economic development today? Do they continue to leave their mark on the modern-day institutions that underlie the wealth of nations? If so, is this true not only in Europe but also in former European colonies and other countries that have been influenced by these traditions? In this paper, we offer some empirical evidence that sheds light on these questions. We exploit two novel datasets that have become available during the last decade. First, Stasavage (2010) compiles data on representative assemblies for 30 European polities during the medieval and early modern period. He codes whether or not assemblies existed, the frequency of their meetings, and whether or not they could veto taxes and/or exert control over expenditures. Second, Putterman and Weil (2010) assemble estimates of where the ancestors of the present-day populations of 165 countries were living at the beginning of the early modern period. Exploiting these two datasets, we explore the extent to which deep historical European traditions of representative institutions have left their mark on institutional quality and incomes across the globe today.

To develop a measure of representative assembly experience, we begin by matching each of the 30 Stasavage polities to 15 present-day European countries. We then use the Putterman and Weil (2010) data to construct for each country in our sample a weighted average of medieval/early modern assembly experiences. Based on the Putterman and Weil data we know for each country the shares of its population that are descended from the circa 1500 populations of the 15 above-mentioned European countries. Each country's assembly experience, then, is the weighted average of the 15 assembly experiences where the weights are the 15 corresponding

descendancy shares. Based on bivariate cross-sectional samples of between 119 and 159 countries, we find that our measure of representative assembly experience in the medieval and early modern periods is positively and significantly related to present-day income levels and measures of institutional quality. The latter include both measures of political institutional quality (e.g., Polity democracy scores) and the rule of law and security of property rights (from the Fraser Institute's Economic Freedom of the World indices). The positive relation to present-day legal institutions and property rights is robust to controlling for present-day income and a standard set of controls.

In our empirical analysis, we also make a novel contribution by confronting the Glaeser et al. (2004) critique. Glaeser et al. argue that empirical studies emphasizing the historical transmissions of European institutional quality overlook the fact that those transmissions were likely also linked to the transmission of other unobserved factors (e.g., European human capital) that represented the true causal channels in the determination of income levels today. We refer to this as an omitted "European-ness" effect. We confront this critique in two ways that, to our knowledge, have not been exploited previously in the literature.

First, we calculate the share of each country's population descended from the 15 European countries that correspond to the Stasavage data and include this as an additional control in the robustness checks. If our baseline results are driven by omitted European influence as suggested in Glaeser et al. (2004), we should find that the significance of assembly experience disappears when including this additional control. Second, we expand upon this by weighting each of the 15 descendancy shares by the 1500 income level of the relevant country. This second measure recognizes that descendants from different European polities possessed different types of human capital, some of which may have been more wealth enhancing than others. The

positive and significant relation between present-day legal institutions and representative assembly experience is robust to the inclusion of either of these “European-ness” controls. Thus, our results suggest that long-institutional memory based on medieval/early modern representative assembly experience has been passed down through the generations and remains an important determinant of whether or not societies today support limited and non-predatory governance. They also suggest that this long-institutional memory is distinct from general “European-ness” effects.

Our research contributes to the growing literature on the deep roots of economic development (Spolaore and Wacziarg 2013). For example, Diamond (1997) argues that prehistoric biogeographical conditions determined the pace at which agriculture and domestication spread in different regions of the world. Olsson and Hibbs (2005) and Ashraf and Galor (2011) report evidence consistent with this being a channel through which those prehistoric conditions left their imprint income levels today. Comin et al. (2010) consider rates of technology adoption in 1500 CE, 0 CE, and 1000 BCE. They report that rates from 1500 CE are robustly related to today’s income levels and that, in turn, technology adoption rates in the earlier periods are robust predictors of the 1500 CE rates. Other researchers argue that the presence of particular crops and/or germs helped to determine the settlement patterns of European colonizers and, indirectly, present-day levels of development (e.g., Engerman and Sokoloff 1997; Sokoloff and Engerman 2000; Acemoglu et al. 2001, 2002; Easterly and Levine 2003). Finally, researchers have explored the roles of legacies of genetic diversity (Ashraf and Galor 2013) and genetic distance from populations at the technological frontier (Spolaore and Wacziarg 2009) in the determination of income levels today.

Our work emphasizes the institutional nature of these deep historical roots, similar to Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002) and also the work on legal origins by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) and La Porta (2008). By combining the Stasavage (2010) and Putterman and Weil (2010) datasets we are able to explore not only the relationship between European experiences with representative assemblies in the medieval and early modern period and present-day European institutions and incomes, but also with institutions and incomes in countries across the globe. This is because the Putterman and Weil ancestry data allow us to explore whether or not institutional memory of representative institutions (carried by descendants of early modern European migrants) left its mark on their non-European destinations.

We have organized this paper as follows. In section 2 we briefly discuss the European experiences with representative assemblies that began in the medieval era. We elaborate on the roles that these assemblies played in providing constitutional checks on European monarchs. Then in section 3 we describe the data that we employ to explore the relationship between medieval and early modern assembly experiences and incomes and institutions today. We report our empirical findings in section 4 and then conclude the paper in section 5.

2. Representative Assemblies

In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, monarchs responded to financial and military pressures by convoking assemblies that drew their representation from the politically powerful estates (classes or orders) (Myers 1975; Russell 1982; North and Weingast 1989; van Zanden et al. 2012, pp. 844-877). These estates included the clergy (first estate), the nobility (second estate), and, increasingly over time, the burghers of medieval towns (third estate). Monarchs employed these

assemblies as means towards obtaining political and financial support for their policies.³ In exchange for their consent to additional military levies and/or taxes, the estates received various rights and immunities.

The idea that monarchs take the initiative in convoking such assemblies seems at first blush counterintuitive. We are more likely to think in terms of citizens demanding of a monarch that there be *no taxation without representation!* However, initiative on the part of a monarch is made intelligible in terms of political bargaining within Congelton's (2007, 2011) "King and Council" template. Monarchs were most often seeking military resources (both manpower and financial) from the estates. Medieval Europe was a world of relatively weak monarchs who depended on their noble vassals (which was a warrior class) and the clergy and towns (sources of wealth) to carry out their exploits. But a medieval monarch faced a credible commitment problem. Members of the estates were hesitant to provide resources because they feared that a monarch's exploits could lead to increasing future burdens placed upon them. Unless a monarch could commit to not insisting on more burdensome obligations in the future, he was likely to face low effort, shirking, and avoidance on the part of the estates. However, a monarch's commitments were not credible since, *ex post*, he would have an incentive to renege. By providing the estates with representation in an assembly, monarchs established a forum that allowed them to credibly concede some authority in exchange for the desired obligations.

The credible commitment story is consistent with the weakness of European monarchs (relative to those of the medieval Middle East and China) and their lack of centralized, effective bureaucracies (Wickham 1984, 2005, 2009; North 1990; Brennan and Buchanan 2006).

³ These assemblies had antecedents in the tribal customs of Germanic barbarian groups that succeeded the Western Roman Empire (Downing 1989; Barnwell and Mostert 2003; van Zanden et al. 2012). See Young (2015) for a discussion of these early Germanic institutions circa 50 BC-50 AD and how they were influenced by Julius Caesar's conquest of Gaul.

However, within Europe, monarchs that were too weak often faced difficulties in employing assemblies as credible commitment mechanisms. Boucoyannis (2015) argues that it was the relatively strong European monarchs (e.g., those of England in the High Middle Ages) who were able to compel members of the estates to attend their assemblies. As Stasavage (2016, p. 158) puts it: “[A] ruler’s authority must be sufficiently weak that he cannot simply extract what he wants without consent [but where] some degree of authority is necessary in order to get the people to show up at all.” This is also consistent with the fact that weaker (and particularly early medieval) monarchs resorted traveling incessantly to gain consent for their policies from the leading men of their realms (Marongiu 1968, p. 23; Bernhardt 1993; de Jouvenel 1993 [1947], p. 7; Ertman 1997, pp. 44 & 236; Heather 2009, p. 529).

Over time, something that began as a practical expedient on the part of monarchs became viewed as something fundamental to just rule. With the rehabilitation of the Justinian Code in the twelfth century by the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick Barbarossa, representation began to be viewed in terms of the legal maxim: *quod omnes tangit ab omnibus probetur* (“what touches all should be approved by all”). Scholars such as Pitkin (1967), Manin (1997), and Schwartzberg (2014) emphasize variants of this legal maxim as important for the development of medieval theory regarding representative government.⁴ While in practice the activity and strength of representative assemblies varied significantly across European polities, to a greater or lesser extent it fostered a shared belief in their legitimacy.

Scholars have sought to account for the development of representative government in Europe rather than elsewhere; likewise, they have also sought to account for variation in that development across Europe. For example, some have pointed to the political fragmentation that

⁴ See Marongiu (1968, pp. 33-37) and Stasavage (2016, pp. 150-152) for a concise discussion of the development and application of different variants of the original maxim.

followed the decline of the Western Roman Empire combined with the practice followed by Germanic barbarian leaders of granting land to their warriors in exchange for their service (Wickham 1984, 2005, 2009; Downing 1989; Jones 2003 [1981], Young 2017). As such, medieval monarchs found themselves in weak bargaining positions; in particular, the means by which they could effectively assert their (Salter and Young 2017a). Also related medieval European political fragmentation, Bates & Lien (1985), Levi (1988), Blockmans (1998), and Stasavage (2011) argue that frequent warfare led monarchs to establish assemblies that granted consultation and consent roles to taxpayers in exchange for them providing monarchs with the means to wage those wars.

In terms of variation across Europe, an early hypothesis is associated with Guizot (1838) who argues that urbanization and the growth of commerce led medieval towns to bargain for self-governance and say in the policies of princes/monarchs; Abramson & Boix (2014) and Boix (2015) report evidence consistent with this hypothesis. (Alternatively, van Zanden et al. (2012) report that representative assembly activity leads urbanization.) And Stasavage (2010) argues that the costs associated with organizing assemblies and enforcing attendance were increasing in the geographic size of a polity. Based on the data that he assembles concerning assembly experiences – the same data that we employ in this paper – he reports evidence that is consistent with this hypothesis.

3. Data

To explore the relationships between medieval and early modern experiences with representative assemblies and incomes and institutional quality today, we draw on the data assembled by Stasavage (2010). These data are measures of representative assembly activity in Europe

between 1250 and 1800. Stasavage draws from a large number of secondary historical sources that provide information regarding 30 European polities.⁵ Based on these secondary sources, for each of the 50 year intervals (11) within the 1250-1800 period, Stasavage records for each polity whether or not an assembly existed; when it did he records the frequency of its meetings, whether or not its consent was needed for new taxes, and whether or not it influenced control over the monarch's expenditure policies.

Our analysis here is cross-sectional; we seek a variable that will capture historical variation in representative assembly activity and that can be related to present-day income levels and measures of institutional quality. For each of the 11 intervals that a polity is observed, a variable (*ASSEMBLY*) takes the value of 1 if a representative assembly existed; 0 otherwise. For each polity we calculate the average value of this variable over the observed intervals (*ASSEMBLY_AVG*). For each of the 11 intervals that a polity is observed, another variable (*FREQUENCY*) takes a value equal to the number of times that the assembly met divided by 50. For each polity we calculate the average value of this variable over the observed intervals (*FREQUENCY_AVG*). Not every polity is observed for every 50-year interval since not every polity existed continuously for the entire 550 year period. We record for each polity the *PERIODS_IN_SAMPLE* out of the possible 11 intervals. Our measure of historical representative assembly activity for each European polity is then:

$$(1) \quad \textit{Assembly Experience} = (\textit{ASSEMBLY_AVG} \times \textit{FREQUENCY_AVG} \times \textit{PERIODS_IN_SAMPLE}).$$

⁵ Due to data limitations on other control variables Stasavage's (2010) empirical analysis includes only 24 of these polities. For a full list of the secondary sources see the online appendix to Stasavage (2010): <http://politics.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/5395/onlineappendix.pdf>. An alternative data set on 32 European assemblies for a comparable time period is assembled by van Zanden et al. (2012).

This measure takes into account both the overall time during which an assembly was in existence as well as the frequency of meetings during that overall time.⁶

First, we match the historical European polities in the Stasavage dataset to present-day countries (**table 1**). When a single historical polity matches to a single present-day country, we record the latter's *historical* assembly experience based on that of the former. (We say "historical" here because the result, even though based on (1) above, is *not* the value of the variable that enters our estimations. This will become clear below.) In a number of cases, however, multiple historical polities match to a single present-day country (notably, e.g., eight polities match to present-day Italy, a country that was not unified until the nineteenth century) such that 30 historical polities are ultimately matched to 15 present-day countries. In these cases, a present-day country's historical assembly experience is recorded as the average of values for the historical polities that are matched to it. (E.g., Switzerland's historical assembly experience is the average value over Basel, Geneva, and Zurich.)⁷ We use the historical assembly experiences of these 15 countries to create a measure our *Assembly Experience* variable for all countries included in the Putterman and Weil (2010) dataset that will be used in the estimations.

We hypothesize that historical experiences with representative institutions leave their mark on present-day incomes and institutions via institutional memory. Through experience with representative institutions, individuals become more effective at constraining rulers in such a way that state capacity is employed in ways that are non-predatory and facilitate wealth-creation. This increased effectiveness comes in part from individuals being better able to operate within

⁶ Since the averages (*ASSEMBLY_AVG*; *FREQUENCY_AVG*) are taken over intervals (out of a possible 11) during which the polity is observed (existed), the final term in the product (*PERIODS_IN_SAMPLE*) adjusts the measure upward for polities that are observed during a larger portion of the overall 550 year period.

⁷ Taking an unweighted average is arbitrary; in particular cases (e.g., historical France and Burgundy each taken equally in relation to present-day France) it may seem questionable. However, what would be a weighted average alternative that can be applied generally is unclear to us. We have therefore decided to take the most straightforward approach.

the representative institutions; also in part from a greater belief in their legitimacy due to individuals' shared experience with those institutions (Ostrom 2007 [1971]; Wagner 2005). As such, we relate the historical experiences of European polities to countries whose present-day populations descended in part from those European polities using the Putterman and Weil (2010) estimates.

Putterman and Weil (2010) construct a matrix where each row and column corresponds to a present-day (year 2000) country. Moving along a particular country row, each cell contains an estimate of the portion of that country's present-day population that is descended from individuals living circa 1500 in the geographic region that corresponds to the column country.⁸ We refer to these as a country's *descendancy shares*. For all present-day countries, we calculate *Assembly Experience* as the descendancy share-weighted sum of the historical assembly experiences of 15 European countries that match to the 30 Stasavage historical polities. Thus, our estimate of *Assembly Experience* used in regressions will equal a weighted average of the *Assembly Experience* coming from the 15 Stasavage countries. For example, the United Kingdom descendancy share for Angola is 0.0026; thus $0.0026 \times (\text{Assembly Experience}_{\text{United Kingdom}})$ is one component of $\text{Assembly Experience}_{\text{Angola}}$. Since we only use descendancy shares associated with European countries that are directly matched to the Stasavage (2010) historical polities, we interpret $\text{Assembly Experience}_{\text{Angola}}$ (and that of other countries) as a measure of that country's

⁸ While these are the best estimates available and have been used in the economic development literature (e.g., Comin et al. 2010) there are clearly conceptual and practical issues that go along with them. The main appendix to Putterman and Weil (2010) does a good job of discussing these issues: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Faculty/Louis_Putterman/Appendix%20to%201500%20Origins%20Matrix%201.1.doc. A recent paper by Easterly and Levine (2016) assembles data on European population shares during the time of colonization, which is distinct from the Putterman and Weil descendancy shares (where, e.g., someone who moves from the UK to the US today can still potentially count towards the UK descendancy share in the US). Easterly and Levine show that colonization shares are important in accounting for income levels today even when controlling for descendancy shares. However, our use of the descendancy shares is appropriate because we hypothesize that long-institutional memory of assembly activity is transmitted through the generations, such that descendants from circa 1500 populations bring it with them to their destinations regardless of whether they reach those destinations in 1500 or 1900.

institutional memory of experiences with medieval/early-modern European representative institutions. This yields a sample of 165 such experiences.

Note that in our estimations the *Assembly Experience* of any present-day country is the descendency share-weighted sum of the historical assembly experiences of 15 European countries. This is the case for *all* of the countries in our sample *including the 15 present-day European countries that matched to the Stasavage polities.* (For example, then the *Assembly Experience* of France that enters our estimations is *not* the historical assembly experience of France. To the extent that there are descendants of individuals from the other 14 European countries circa 1500, the historical assembly of those 14 countries also factor in.) Therefore we construct *Assembly Experience* consistently across all countries in our sample, European or otherwise. Doing so is appropriate given our hypothesis of long-institutional memory that is transmitted across through both time and space.⁹

We draw income (i.e., real GDP per capita) data from the Penn World Table (PWT), version 9.0 (Feenstra et al. 2015). From the PWT we also gather data for each country on employment on a share of its population and the PWT-constructed human capital index, based on years in school and the returns to education. These variables are used as additional controls in many of our estimations, along with regional dummies where countries are grouped according to seven different regions defined by the World Bank.¹⁰

Our measures of political institutions are the Polity IV democracy scores (Marshall et al. 2016) and the checks and balances measure developed by Keefer and Stasavage (2003) and

⁹ We additionally ran estimations based on *Assembly Experience* using descendency shares for non-Stasavage countries and non-weighted values of *Assembly Experience* for the 15 Stasavage countries. The results are not qualitatively different than those reported below and they are available upon request.

¹⁰ The seven categories include East Asia and Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, North America, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa. See <https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups> for details.

maintained by the World Bank Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001). Our measure of economic institutions is drawn from the Fraser Institute's Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) report (Gwartney et al., 2016). Motivated by work such as North and Weingast (1989), we focus on the legal system and property rights area index from the EFW report.

The Polity IV *Democracy* scores place particular emphasis recruitment for the executive branch of government and the constraints placed on that branch. Country scores are on a scale of 0 to 10, with 10 representing political institutions of the highest quality (i.e., most democratic recruitment and effective constraints). Alternatively, *Checks & Balances* is based on the number of "veto players" (i.e., decision-makers whose agreement is necessary for changes in policy to occur) that exist in a country's political system. A higher *Checks & Balances* score corresponds, similarly to Polity IV, to more effective constraints on political agents.

Motivated by work such as North and Weingast (1989), we are particularly interested in a measure of the quality of a country's *Legal System & Property Rights*. As such, we employ the *Legal System & Property Rights* component of the Fraser Institute's Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) index (Gwartney et al. 2016). Each country is evaluated based on the extent of judicial independence and the impartiality of its courts; also the extent to which property rights are protected by law and their exchange is not restricted by government. Each country is scored on a scale of 0 to 10 with 10 indicating the highest quality of legal system and the most secure property rights. The underlying data are based on surveys from three sources: the PRS Group's *International Country Risk Guide*, the World Economic Forum's *Global Competitiveness Report*, and the World Bank's *Doing Business Survey*.¹¹

¹¹ See Gwartney et al. (2016, pp. 275-277) for details on the methodology employed in combining data from these sources into a country's score.

Along with the *Legal System & Property Rights* component, the overall EFW index is based on four other areas of institutional/policy quality: (i) government size, (ii) access to sound money, (iii) the freedom to trade internationally, and (iv) the regulation of markets. Numerous cross-country and panel data studies have documented that the EFW index is positively related to economic growth (e.g., Ayal and Karras 1998; Dawson 1998; Gwartney et al. 1999; de Haan and Sturm 2000; Heckelman and Stroup 2000; Young and Sheehan 2014) as well as many other economic outcomes (Hall and Lawson 2014). In many of our estimations, then, we include the remaining four areas of the EFW index as additional controls.

We address Glaeser et al.'s (2004) argument that historical transmissions of European institutional quality were likely correlated with the transmission of other (unobserved) factors by employing two different measures of "European-ness":

- (2) *European-ness 1* = the sum of European descendency shares;
- (3) *European-ness 2* = the European descendency-weighted average of circa 1500 (log) income levels.

The aim of these measures is to control for unobserved factors (e.g., human capital) that European migrants may have brought with them that may be correlated with both historical representative assembly experience and present-day incomes/institutions. We are, of course, controlling directly for historical representative assembly experience (our variable of primary interest). Our first measure of (otherwise) European-ness is simply a measure of the extent to which a country's present day population is descended individuals living in from Europe circa 1500. The second measure attaches European descendency shares to the 1500 (log) income levels of those European countries: it is based on the same idea as our first measure of European-ness but acknowledges that unobservable factors from different European polities are likely

differentially correlated with income levels today. Thus, our second measure employs 1500 European income levels from the Angus Maddison *Historical Statistics of the World Economy*.¹² (For example, if a non-European country has equal 1500 descendency shares from both the present-day United Kingdom and Italy, we weight the Italy contribution more because it was a higher income country in 1500.) If the unobservable European-ness factors are determinants of present-day income levels, we take that into account in our robustness checks.

Summary statistics for the variables described above are reported in **table 2**. Given availability across variables, our estimations involve between 66 and 95 cross-sectional observations. We report estimations based on both 2005 and 2012 values of present-day variables.

4. Results

In **table 3** we report baseline results where income levels or institutional quality measures are regressed only a constant and our *Assembly Experience* measure. For incomes per capita and the *Legal System & Property Rights* dependent variables, the estimation method is OLS; since the *Democracy* and *Checks & Balances* measures are categorical variables, we report Logit regressions.

We report results using both 2005 values of the dependent variables (upper rows) and the 2012 values of the dependent variables. A number of *deep roots of economic development* studies report results based ostensibly on the dependent variable values that are simply from a time period that is proximate to when the research is undertaken. This is not necessarily problematic; however, researchers (including ourselves) are presently working in the wake of the global

¹² http://www.ggd.net/maddison/Historical_Statistics/vertical-file_02-2010.xls (last accessed July 21, 2017).

financial markets crisis and recession. As such, it seems prudent to report results based both on cross-sectional variation in dependent variables both pre- and post- that global event.

In **table 3** we see that medieval/early modern *Assembly Experience* is positively and (statistically; 1% level) significantly related to income levels today (2005 and 2012). The income per capita variable is logged, so the point estimates imply that a standard deviation increase in *Assembly Experience* (1.342) is associated with about 49% higher incomes today.¹³ This is a large effect. As we shall see, however, this large positive effect will disappear when we introduce additional control variables. For *Legal System & Property Rights*, a standard deviation increase in *Assembly Experience* is associated with about a 0.72 point increase (or about 0.36 of a standard deviation). Those estimates are significant at the 1% level. *Assembly Experience* is also significantly (1% level) positively related to both *Democracy* and *Checks & Balances*. A standard deviation increase in *Assembly Experience* is associated with about a 1.32 increase in the ordered log-odds (equal to a 3.74 odds-ratio) of the *Democracy* score increasing by 1 point and a 0.54 ordered log-odds (a 1.72 odds-ratio) of *Checks & Balances* increasing by 1 point. In summary, the baseline results suggest that historical representative assembly experience is positively and significantly related with higher income levels and the quality of both economic and political institutions; the size of the estimated effects are quantitatively meaningful.

Tables 4A (2005 dependent variables values) and **4B** (2012 values) report on estimations in which we introduce additional control variables and regional fixed effects. *Assembly Experience* no longer enters significantly into the income regressions. (The point estimates are both negative and close to zero.) *Assembly Experience* enters positively and significantly (5%

¹³ The 2005 versus 2012 dependent variable point estimates are quite close to one another. In general this is true throughout the results reported below. When this is *not* the case it is noted. Otherwise we simply report estimated (point) effects in terms of the average of the 2005 and 2012 point estimates; and the quantitative significance of the effects will be reckoned in terms of the average of 2005 and 2012 variable standard deviations (which are also generally quite close to one another).

level) in both of the *Legal System & Property Rights* estimations. A standard deviation increase in the former variable is associated with about a 0.23 point (or 0.12 of a standard deviation) increase in the latter. Turning to the measures of political institutions, *Assembly Experience* does not enter significantly for *Checks & Balances* but it does so in both of the *Democracy* estimations (at the 5% level). A standard deviation increase in *Assembly Experience* is associated with about a 1.36 ordered log-odds (3.90 odds-ratio) of *Democracy* increasing by 1 point. Thus far the results continue to be consistent with historical representative assembly experiences having left significant marks on executive constraint and the rule of law and property rights today. In terms of the latter, the estimated effects appear somewhat modest. However, we shall argue below (section 4.3) that this is actually not the case.

Notably, the additional controls in the **table 4a** and **table 4b** results include, for each particular dependent variable, the other dependent variables.¹⁴ Unsurprisingly those other-dependent-variable controls often enter significantly. For example, *Legal System & Property Rights* enters positively and significantly (5% level or better) in both income estimations. A standard deviation increase in this variable is associated with about a 30% higher income level. One might conjecture that the correlation between historical traditions of representative institutions and today's income levels (**table 3**) is in part due to an indirect effect via the former's effects on the rule of law and property rights. Income also enters positively and significantly (5% level or better) in the *Legal System & Property Rights* estimations, consistent with plausible simultaneity between those two variables. Lastly, we note that the human capital measure enters positively and significantly (1% level) in both income estimations.

¹⁴ This is true generally except for the fact that *Legal System & Property Rights* is not used as an additional control while, for itself as a dependent variable, *Economic Freedom* is not used as an additional control. These exceptions are motivated by the fact that *Legal System & Property Rights* is an explicit component of *Economic Freedom*.

4.1. *Taxation Consent versus Spending Prerogative*

Now we consider assembly experiences with the ability to veto taxes (*Tax Experience*) and a spending prerogative (*Spending Experience*) separately. Based on the Stasavage (2010) data, these two variables are analogous to *Assembly Experience* except that they are, respectively, based on years where an assembly not only met but, also, had the relevant veto or prerogative. The baseline results are reported in **table 5**. Across the board only *Tax Experience* enters significantly (always 1% level and positively) into the estimations; perhaps surprisingly because medieval assemblies that had no spending prerogative have often been discounted in terms of their importance and effectiveness. For example, Congleton (2011, p. 2) downplays the importance of parliaments before the early modern era: “[A]part from veto power over new taxes, medieval parliaments had very limited authority.” Stasavage (2010, p. 627) also notes that “[a]lthough many European assemblies had the right to consent to or refuse new taxes, in practice those that gained the greatest reputations for delivering revenues also enjoyed [a] further [spending] prerogative.”

Undoubtedly, a representative assembly that exercised a spending prerogative as well as a tax veto was a more formidable political player than one that only exercised the latter. However, one should keep a couple of things in mind. First, in terms of extraordinary expenditures, waging war was essentially all that medieval monarchies had going on. Veto power over new taxes was by no means trivial; it assured that a monarch’s undesirable military exploits could be nixed. Second, unlike a spending prerogative that is a positive political property right (i.e., an assembly actively decides to *do something* with revenues that have or will be collected), the role of providing or withholding consent to taxes is a straightforwardly negative check on a monarch’s actions; it is putting into practice the idea of telling a ruler what he or she *cannot* do. Without

discounting the importance of a spending prerogative, our results may suggest that a tradition of telling a ruler *no* is particularly important for establishing non-predatory governance.

The last thing we note about **table 5** is that, as was the case with general *Assembly Experience* in **table 3**, the estimated effects of *Taxes Experience* on income levels are quite large. This will, again, change with the introduction of additional controls. Alternatively, the estimates on the institutional quality dependent variables indicate comparable effects to those reported and discussed in **table 3** above. A standard deviation increase in *Taxes Experience* (1.195) is associated with about a 0.57 points (0.29 of a standard deviation) increase in *Legal System & Property Rights*; the estimated effect is quantitatively similar for *Checks & Balances* (0.53 log-odds; 1.70 odds-ratio). The estimated effect is notably larger for *Democracy*: a standard deviation increase in *Tax Experience* is associated with an increase of about 2.25 in the log-odds (9.49 odds-ratio) of *Democracy* increasing by 1 point.

However, the significant effects of *Tax Experience* mostly disappear when the additional controls and regional fixed effects are included (**tables 6a** and **6b**). There remains only a positive and significant estimated effect for *Legal System & Property Rights*, and only for the 2012 values of this dependent variable. Given considerably smaller degrees of freedom when additional controls and regional fixed effects are concluded, this lack of statistical significance could be driven by collinearity between *Tax Experience* and *Spending Experience*. (The pairwise correlation between the two variables is 0.74.) Alternatively, it could be that, when it comes to representative assembly experience, we have a case of the whole being more important than the sum of its parts. We cannot at present discriminate between these and other hypotheses. We instead proceed with a focus on overall medieval/early modern representative assembly experiences.

4.2. *Confronting the Glaeser et al. (2004) Critique: Controlling for “European-ness”*

According to Glaeser et al. (2004), empirical studies that emphasize the historical transmissions of European institutions are suspect because European colonists brought with them other factors (e.g., European human capital) that are unobserved by researchers but played an important role in the determination of how institutions and incomes evolved, still leaving their mark today. To wit: Europeans did not only bring their institutions to foreign lands; they also brought some other forms of “European-ness” that are hard to observe and/or measure yet important for the long-run evolution of institutions and economic development.

Tables 7a-8b report the results of estimations that relate the dependent variables to *Assembly Experience* while controlling for one of our two “European-ness” measures. These measures are the sum of European descendency shares (**7a** and **7b**: *European-ness 1*) and the European descendency-weighted average of circa 1500 (log) income levels (**8a** and **8b**: *European-ness 2*). In all of these estimations, the additional controls and regional fixed effects are also included.

The most robust result is that *Assembly Experience* always enters positively and significantly (10% level or better) for *Legal System & Property Rights*. The point estimates are comparable to those reported from estimations without a European-ness control. Additionally, the estimated effect of *Assembly Experience* for *Democracy* is positive in all specifications and significant at the 10 % level in **table 7a**. (The p-value associated with *Assembly Experience* in the *Democracy* estimations of **table 7b**, **table 8a**, and **table 9b** are not far off of the 10% mark at 0.151, 0.113, and 0.160, respectively.) The sizes of the estimated effects are again comparable to those reported when no European-ness control is included. Given two plausible controls to

address the Glaeser et al. critique, the results still suggest that medieval and early modern experiences with representative institutions have left a positive legacy in terms of greater executive constraint and stronger rule of law and property rights in countries today.

In the appendix (**tables A1** and **A2**) we report estimations that include a European-ness control but do not include additional controls and regional fixed effects (analogous to **table 3**). In those estimations, *Assembly Experience* always enters positively and significantly (5% level or better) for all dependent variables except *Checks & Balances*. Also of interest is the fact that the European-ness controls always enter positively and significantly (1% level) in the income level estimations and the estimated effects are large. For example, in the case of *European-ness 1* control a standard deviation (0.32) increase in this variable is associated with about a 36% higher income level. However, the European-ness measures never enter significantly for income in **tables 7a-8b** and the point estimates are all very small. Alternatively, *Legal System & Property Rights* and *Human Capital* both always enter positively and significantly (5% level or better for the former; 1% level or better for the latter) for income. This would be consistent with these two factors accounting for much of the income-enhancing “European-ness” associated with European colonization.

4.4 Excluding “Zero” Assembly Experience Countries or “Neo-Europes”

One concern is that about a third of the countries included in our estimations have zero values for representative assembly experience. Given the skewed distribution of our control variable of interest, this raises a serious concern that our estimates on *Assembly Experience* are biased. To address this concern we re-estimated the models from **tables 4a** and **4b** excluding the zero *Assembly Experience* observations. The results are essentially unchanged. Again, the

estimated effects of *Assembly Experience* on both *Legal System & Property Rights* and *Democracy* are both positive and statistically significant at the 5% level or better. The point estimates are similar in size to those reported in **tables 4a** and **4b**.

Another concern is that the results are being entirely driven by countries with particularly high *Assembly Experience* values. Our hypothesis has been that historical experiences with representative institutions leave their mark on present-day incomes and institutions via long-institutional memory. But if it holds true only for a relatively small number of “neo-Europes”, then that would obviously discount not only its generality but, along with it, the extent to which it is interesting.

Addressing this second concern is asking quite a bit from our cross-sectional data. Unlike the exclusion of zero *Assembly Experience* observations, the exclusion of observations defining the top of this variable’s distribution not only decreases our degrees of freedom but also leaves us with less (non-zero) variation in *Assembly Experience* with which to estimate the effect. That being said, we ran additional estimations excluding, respectively, the top 5%, 10%, and 18% of *Assembly Experience* observations. The 5% and 10% cutoffs are arbitrary. However, 18% as the minimum cutoff such that, specifically, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the US are all excluded.¹⁵

To conserve space, these results are reported in, respectively, **tables A3a**, **A3b**, and **A3c** of the appendix. With the 5% cutoff the results are qualitatively and quantitatively unchanged in any meaningful way; *Assembly Experience* is still statistically significant (1% level) for *Legal System & Property Rights* and *Democracy*. For the 10% cutoff level the relevant estimates are

¹⁵ The 5%, 10%, and 18% cutoffs are applied to the full sample of 165 countries for which we have *Assembly Experience* observations constructed. This is obviously a (often much) larger number than the observations in our estimations. However, not that our last cutoff (18%) is based on that for which, at the margin, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the US are all excluded. If we chose a different total number of observations to base cutoffs from, then, in the final (**table A3c**) case the ultimate sample would be the same; only the % cutoff would be altered.

mostly unchanged qualitatively or quantitatively in a meaningful way. (The exception is for *Democracy* based on the 2005 data. The point estimate is still positive for *Assembly Experience* but considerably smaller.) However, statistical significance disappears save for the *Democracy* estimation based on 2012 data, and then only at the 10% level. However, the p-values associated with the *Legal System & Property Rights* estimate is very close to the 10% threshold based on the 2005 data (0.101; the p-value is 0.232 with the 2012 data, which is farther from the mark). Finally, for the 18% cutoff level *Assembly Experience* enters positively and significantly (10% level) for *Democracy* in both the 2005 and 2012 estimations. The estimated effects on *Legal System & Property Rights* are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to what we have reported above, but they again fall short of 10% level statistical significance. However, given the share of non-zero *Assembly Experience* countries that we are excluding (34%) the lack of significance is perhaps not surprising.

4.3 *Quantitative Importance of Representative Assembly Experience*

If we treat the average point estimates across **Tables 7a-8b** as a benchmark, a standard deviation increase in *Assembly Experience* is associated with about a 0.28 point (or 0.14 of a standard deviation) increase in *Legal System & Property Rights*. Furthermore, a standard deviation increase in *Assembly Experience* is associated with about a 1.60 ordered log-odds (4.95 odds-ratio) of *Democracy* increasing by 1 point. (The standard deviation of *Democracy* is about 3.9 points.) These estimated effects may both be interpreted as modest. Here we discuss some alternative – and we think interesting – perspectives from which to reckon the economic importance of the estimates. From some of these perspectives the estimated effects seem less modest.

Part of the motivation for this paper – and, it is fair to say, many of deep roots of economic development studies – is the historical exceptionalism of certain regions of the world and how that exceptionalism has left its mark on economic outcomes today. In some cases, that exceptionalism is based on purely exogenous factors (e.g., a region’s biodiversity during early human settlements); in other cases it is based on a mix of exogenous factors and endogenous decisions; this is likely to have been the case when it came to the emergence of representative assemblies in Europe. Regardless, in retrospect we believe that some of those exceptional experiences gave certain regions of the world a leg up in very long-run economic development. In this case, then, it is interesting to ask how having the "leg up" associated with medieval and early modern representative assemblies affected incomes and institutions relative to countries that did not.

Tables 10a reports summary statistics for *Assembly Experience* and the institutional variables for (i) the countries that correspond to the Stasavage historical European polities versus (ii) those that do not, and (iii) European countries generally versus (iv) non-European countries. Not surprisingly, subsamples (i) and (iii) have substantially higher *Assembly Experience* values on average (3.46 and 1.50) than do subsamples (ii) and (iv) (0.327 and (0.365). Furthermore, there is a substantial difference between the average *Assembly Experience* of European countries generally and the subset that correspond to the Stasavage. The latter is greater by a factor of about 2.3, which is also not surprising given that these are the European countries for which there is a reliable enough record of medieval and early modern assembly activity for Stasavage to code.

In what follows we again use the average of point estimates from **tables 7a-8b**. If the average country that lacked any (recorded) medieval/early modern representative assembly

activity could increase its *Assembly Experience* level to that of the average Stasavage country (an increase of 3.14) then the associated increase in *Legal System & Property Rights*, all else equal, would be about 0.66 points (or about 0.36 of a standard deviation for the non-Stasavage subsample). From this perspective the estimated effect is somewhat less modest. Also, the same increase in *Assembly Experience* would be associated with about a 3.75 ordered log-odds (42.5 odds-ratio) of *Democracy* increasing by 1 point. This is a large effect.

Furthermore, recall that about a third of the countries in our analysis have zero *Assembly Experience* values. For these countries, going to the average *Assembly Experience* of Stasavage countries (3.46) would be associated with about a 0.72 point increase in *Legal System & Property Rights* and about a 4.13 ordered log-odds (62.2 odds-ratio) of *Democracy* increasing by 1 point.

If we instead compared European versus non-European subsamples, the difference in *Assembly Experience* averages (1.132) is comparable to the standard deviation of *Assembly Experience* in the full sample (1.342). Comparing these two subsamples, then yields a perspective on the economic importance of the estimated effects that is similar to that based on the full sample summary statistics. Alternatively, the non-European *Assembly Experience* average (0.365) is quite close to that of the non-Stasavage subsample (0.327). Comparing non-European and Stasavage subsamples, therefore, again yields a perspective from which the estimated effects are not so modest.

5. Conclusions

Commenting on Charlemagne, the historian Pierre Riché (1993 [1983], p. 125) notes that:

Each year before the summer campaigns, he convened the *conventus generalis*, or “general assembly,” where great matters of state were discussed in common. [...] A prearranged agenda was proposed for debate and approval by separate lay and cleric blocs that made up the assembly.

Even the great Frankish king and first Holy Roman Emperor – the man who consolidated under his rule the largest part of what had been the Western Roman Empire – felt compelled to seek out the advice and, at least to some extent, the consent of the leading men of his realm. We know relatively little regarding the early medieval assemblies of Charlemagne, but we do know that they were an early part of the historical traditions in representative government that are characteristic of and unique to Europe.

These historical traditions may lend some insight as to why some countries’ governments are able to credibly commit to the rule of law and protection of property rights while others are not. While no one would claim that the Model Parliament of Edward I’s England – much less any assembly of Charlemagne – was part of a representative government in the sense in which we use that term today, medieval assemblies were important institutions through which political elites affected corporate expression of their common interests; all else equal, this worked to check monarchs’ power and limit their activities to those consistent with a generality norm (at least in regards to the leading men of the realm) (Salter and Young 2017b). And well-defined property rights enforced under the rule of law promote prosperity generally.

In this paper, we explore whether or not long-institutional memories of historical representative assembly experiences have carried through both generations and migrations, leaving their marks on incomes and institutions across the globe today. To do so, we combine Stasavage’s (2010) data on medieval/early modern representative assembly activity in Europe

with the Putterman and Weil (2010) data on descendency shares from circa 1500 populations. For each country in our sample we are able, then, to construct a measure of historical assembly experience. Historical assembly experience is then related to income levels and measures of institutional quality for a large cross-section of countries.

We report that assembly experience is indeed positively and significantly correlated with current income levels, a measure of the rule of law and property rights, and the Polity IV index that emphasizes constraints on the executive. Once the latter two variables are controlled for, the estimated effect of assembly experience on current incomes is insignificant. However, the correlation between assembly experience and either institutional measure is robust to controlling for number of other variables including, importantly, measures of the general influence of European descendants (one of which is weighted to control for the 1500 income levels of different European origins). This decreases our concern that other (unobserved) aspects of European influence were transmitted along with institutional memory and are truly driving the results.

Notably, our findings can be considered relative those reported in the highly influential papers by Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002). While the findings of those papers are not uncontroversial, their basic claim is that European colonization had lasting impacts on economic outcomes in other regions of the world by having persistent effects on institutional quality. Furthermore, depending on the conditions that Europeans encountered (e.g., indigenous population densities; climates; pathogens) they chose to establish either extractive institutions of inclusive ones that resembled those in the lands from which they came. European institutional transmissions were, then, either a blessing or a curse depending on those conditions. Our results neither directly support nor contradict those of Acemoglu et al. However, while we also find that

(a different type) of European institutional transmission has had lasting impacts on economic outcomes today, the long-institutional memory of representative assembly activity appears to have been an unmitigated positive for rule of law and property rights, executive constraint, and, at least indirectly, income levels.

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TABLES

Table 1 Matching of historical European polities to present-day countries

Historical Polity	Present-Day Country
Austria	Austria
Denmark	Denmark
Castile	Spain
England	United Kingdom
Hungary	Hungary
Holland	Netherlands
Poland	Poland
Portugal	Portugal
Russia	Russian Federation
Sweden	Sweden
Bruges	Belgium
Ghent	Belgium
Burgundy (Flanders)	France
France	France
Basel	Switzerland
Geneva	Switzerland
Zurich	Switzerland
Cologne	Germany
Nuremberg	Germany
Prussia (Brandenburg)	Germany
Saxony	Germany
Wurttemberg	Germany
Florence	Italy
Genoa	Italy
Milan	Italy
Kingdom of Naples	Italy
Piedmont	Italy
Siena	Italy
Tuscany	Italy
Venice	Italy

Table 2 Summary statistics for variables included in regressions

Assembly Variables	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Assembly Experience	165	0.612	1.342	0	6.681
Tax Experience	165	0.546	1.195	0	5.757
Spending Experience	165	0.206	0.809	0	5.757
Historical Influence Variables	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
European-ness 1	165	0.194	0.32	0	0.995
European-ness 2	165	1.263	2.093	0	6.906
Regional GDP per capita from 1500	150	491	104	400	1100
Year = 2005	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Checks & Balances	161	2.795	1.428	1	6
Democracy	150	5.573	3.936	0	10
Legal System & Property Rights	120	5.840	2.052	1.423	9.461
Size of Government	120	6.535	1.440	2.871	9.225
Access to Sound Money	120	7.974	1.646	0	9.758
International Trade	113	6.961	1.453	0	9.414
Regulation	120	6.691	1.008	4.258	8.802
Real GDP per capita	158	14,526	17,540	589	108610
Employment Share	158	0.396	0.089	0.185	0.656
Population (millions)	158	33.366	110.44	0.109	1305.601
Human Capital	158	2.425	0.694	1.117	3.628
Year = 2012	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Checks & Balances	157	2.885	1.511	1	9
Democracy	152	5.875	3.776	0	10
Legal System & Property Rights	120	5.806	1.902	1.302	9.178
Size of Government	120	6.391	1.428	2.719	9.391
Access to Sound Money	120	8.153	1.508	0	9.842
International Trade	113	6.931	1.391	0	9.257
Regulation	120	6.830	0.923	4.153	8.858
Real GDP per capita	158	18,197	20,783	791	164,136
Employment Share	158	0.414	0.098	0.173	0.748
Population (millions)	158	36.189	115.311	0.109	1355.387
Human Capital	139	2.557	0.697	1.180	3.719

Table 3: Regressions of income levels and institutional measures on assembly experience

Year = 2005	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) Logit	(4) Logit
	Real GDP per capita	Legal System & Property Rights	Democracy	Checks & Balances
Assembly Experience	0.382*** (0.037)	0.567*** (0.071)	1.358*** (0.279)	0.440*** (0.105)

Observations	155	119	150	159
Adjusted R-squared	0.172	0.173		
Year = 2012	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) Logit	(4) Logit
	Real GDP per capita	Legal System & Property Rights	Democracy	Checks & Balances
Assembly Experience	0.347*** (0.036)	0.503*** (0.062)	1.083*** (0.261)	0.365*** (0.086)
Observations	155	119	152	155
Adjusted R-squared	0.148	0.156		

Notes: *, **, *** indicates statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. No additional controls included.

Table 4a: Regressions of 2005 income levels and institutional measures on assembly experience, with additional controls.

Year = 2005	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) Logit	(4) Logit
	Real GDP per capita	Legal System & Property Rights	Democracy	Checks & Balances
Assembly Experience	-0.010 (0.033)	0.187** (0.075)	1.060** (0.453)	-0.030 (0.162)
Checks & Balances	-0.042 (0.057)	0.042 (0.114)	0.360 (0.232)	
Democracy	0.002 (0.042)	0.060 (0.076)		0.290** (0.121)
Leg. Sys. & Prop. Rights	0.176*** (0.053)		0.425 (0.297)	0.024 (0.266)
(log) Real GDP per capita		0.680*** (0.200)	0.004 (0.576)	-0.265 (0.543)
Size of Government	-0.032 (0.053)	-0.084 (0.105)	0.169 (0.212)	-0.184 (0.184)
Access to Sound Money	-0.067 (0.058)	0.172 (0.110)	0.562*** (0.203)	-0.456 (0.286)
International Trade	0.143** (0.065)	0.085 (0.146)	-0.058 (0.403)	0.789** (0.358)
Regulation	0.019 (0.101)	0.378* (0.192)	-0.477 (0.423)	0.101 (0.352)
(log) 1500 GDP per capita	0.666* (0.383)	-0.523 (0.942)	-2.012 (2.137)	-1.259 (1.417)
Employment Share	1.491 (1.132)	0.518 (1.835)	-3.463 (4.304)	-1.073 (4.279)
(log) Population	-0.047 (0.057)	-0.117 (0.093)	-0.118 (0.265)	0.194 (0.247)
Human Capital	0.686*** (0.208)	-0.170 (0.290)	1.462** (0.703)	0.492 (0.681)

Observations	96	96	96	96
Adjusted R-squared	0.781	0.703		

Notes: *, **, *** indicates statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regional dummy variables also included, but not reported.

Table 4b: Regressions of 2012 income levels and institutional measures on assembly experience, with additional controls.

Year = 2012	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) Logit	(4) Logit
	Real GDP per capita	Legal System & Property Rights	Democracy	Checks & Balances
Assembly Experience	-0.017 (0.031)	0.157** (0.061)	0.970** (0.474)	-0.130 (0.260)
Checks & Balances	-0.035 (0.059)	-0.081 (0.143)	1.069*** (0.312)	
Democracy	-0.029 (0.033)	0.129* (0.073)		0.539*** (0.162)
Leg. Sys. & Prop. Rights	0.131** (0.053)		0.771*** (0.232)	-0.230 (0.325)
(log) Real GDP per capita		0.604** (0.255)	-0.053 (0.491)	-0.188 (0.533)
Size of Government	-0.108** (0.051)	-0.120 (0.113)	0.394 (0.240)	-0.747*** (0.252)
Access to Sound Money	0.045 (0.056)	0.097 (0.136)	0.923*** (0.177)	-0.963*** (0.261)
International Trade	0.020 (0.062)	0.130 (0.156)	0.229 (0.312)	0.904** (0.395)
Regulation	0.007 (0.109)	0.445** (0.203)	-1.479*** (0.442)	1.157*** (0.361)

(log) 1500 GDP per capita	0.631** (0.312)	0.487 (1.092)	-5.737 (4.216)	0.353 (2.010)
Employment Share	0.478 (1.016)	1.814 (1.813)	-4.016 (3.507)	-2.689 (3.842)
(log) Population	-0.071 (0.054)	-0.178* (0.100)	-0.330 (0.234)	0.560** (0.259)
Human Capital	0.873*** (0.174)	0.126 (0.367)	0.592 (0.669)	0.960 (0.706)
Observations	93	93	93	93
Adjusted R- squared	0.805	0.690		

Notes: *, **, *** indicates statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regional dummy variables also included, but not reported.

Table 5: Regressions of income levels and institutional measures on assembly experience concerning taxes and spending separately.

Year = 2005	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) Logit	(4) Logit
	Real GDP per capita	Legal System & Property Rights	Democracy	Checks & Balances
Taxes Experience	0.415*** (0.071)	0.496*** (0.145)	1.456*** (0.377)	0.497*** (0.129)
Spending Experience	0.008 (0.075)	0.205 (0.147)	-0.007 (0.674)	-0.006 (0.257)
Observations	155	119	150	159
Adjusted R- squared	0.169	0.165		
Year = 2012	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) Logit	(4) Logit
	Real GDP per capita	Legal System & Property Rights	Democracy	Checks & Balances
Taxes Experience	0.380*** (0.062)	0.450*** (0.111)	1.570*** (0.408)	0.385*** (0.090)
Spending Experience	0.009 (0.063)	0.168 (0.104)	-0.845 (0.525)	0.059 (0.225)
Observations	155	119	152	155
Adjusted R- squared	0.138	0.136		

Notes: *, **, *** indicates statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table 6a: Regressions of 2005 income levels and institutional measures on assembly experience concerning taxes and spending separately; additional controls included.

Year = 2005	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) Logit	(4) Logit
	Real GDP per capita	Legal System & Property Rights	Democracy	Checks & Balances
Taxes Experience	0.019 (0.045)	0.141 (0.120)	0.747 (0.455)	-0.088 (0.186)
Spending Experience	-0.048 (0.049)	0.115 (0.140)	1.316 (0.848)	0.232 (0.277)
Checks & Balances	-0.039 (0.058)	0.031 (0.116)	0.398* (0.241)	
Democracy	0.000 (0.042)	0.064 (0.076)		0.293** (0.123)
Leg. Sys. & Prop. Rights	0.176*** (0.053)		0.437 (0.299)	-0.004 (0.268)
(log) Real GDP per capita		0.682*** (0.201)	0.003 (0.589)	-0.239 (0.551)
Size of Government	-0.027 (0.054)	-0.099 (0.107)	0.114 (0.222)	-0.218 (0.199)
Access to Sound Money	-0.066 (0.058)	0.167 (0.111)	0.573*** (0.211)	-0.471 (0.294)
International Trade	0.139** (0.067)	0.100 (0.148)	-0.018 (0.417)	0.839** (0.378)
Regulation	0.016 (0.101)	0.392** (0.192)	-0.467 (0.442)	0.106 (0.358)
(log) 1500 GDP per capita	0.740* (0.440)	-0.797 (1.016)	-2.791 (2.455)	-1.794 (1.518)
Employment Share	1.517 (1.137)	0.441 (1.856)	-3.427 (4.376)	-1.425 (4.366)
(log) Population	-0.049 (0.057)	-0.111 (0.094)	-0.132 (0.275)	0.183 (0.246)
Human Capital	0.697*** (0.212)	-0.188 (0.301)	1.251 (0.775)	0.350 (0.716)
Observations	96	96	96	96
Adjusted R- squared	0.779	0.698		

Notes: *, **, *** indicates statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regional dummy variables also included, but not reported.

Table 6b: Regressions of 2012 income levels and institutional measures on assembly experience concerning taxes and spending separately; additional controls included.

Year = 2012	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) Logit	(4) Logit
	Real GDP per capita	Legal System & Property Rights	Democracy	Checks & Balances
Taxes Experience	-0.005 (0.039)	0.177** (0.077)	1.232 (0.815)	-0.211 (0.307)
Spending Experience	-0.011 (0.043)	-0.026 (0.088)	-0.438 (1.156)	0.276 (0.327)
Checks & Balances	-0.033 (0.060)	-0.084 (0.144)	1.072*** (0.310)	
Democracy	-0.030 (0.033)	0.131* (0.073)		0.535*** (0.166)
Leg. Sys. & Prop. Rights	0.129** (0.053)		0.775*** (0.233)	-0.243 (0.323)
(log) Real GDP per capita		0.597** (0.257)	-0.095 (0.490)	-0.177 (0.535)
Size of Government	-0.107** (0.052)	-0.126 (0.114)	0.385 (0.236)	-0.762*** (0.259)
Access to Sound Money	0.045 (0.057)	0.096 (0.138)	0.923*** (0.178)	-0.962*** (0.264)
International Trade	0.020 (0.062)	0.129 (0.159)	0.190 (0.322)	0.958** (0.410)
Regulation	0.006 (0.110)	0.455** (0.204)	-1.430*** (0.444)	1.124*** (0.366)
(log) 1500 GDP per capita	0.635* (0.332)	0.487 (1.172)	-5.417 (4.357)	-0.274 (2.226)
Employment Share	0.476 (1.037)	1.840 (1.847)	-3.919 (3.542)	-3.255 (4.054)
(log) Population	-0.073 (0.054)	-0.175* (0.101)	-0.336 (0.236)	0.558** (0.260)
Human Capital	0.870*** (0.175)	0.159 (0.375)	0.705 (0.698)	0.845 (0.709)
Observations	93	93	93	93
Adjusted R- squared	0.802	0.684		

Notes: *, **, *** indicates statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regional dummy variables also included, but not reported.

Table 7a: Regressions of 2005 income levels and institutional measures on assembly experience, with additional controls and “European-ness 1” control (European descendency share).

Year = 2005	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) Logit	(4) Logit
	Real GDP per capita	Legal System & Property Rights	Democracy	Checks & Balances
Assembly Experience	-0.020 (0.049)	0.212* (0.110)	1.444* (0.857)	-0.083 (0.199)
European-ness 1	0.074 (0.262)	-0.191 (0.611)	-1.403 (1.876)	0.423 (1.381)
Checks & Balances	-0.042 (0.058)	0.042 (0.115)	0.368 (0.237)	
Democracy	0.001 (0.042)	0.061 (0.076)		0.288** (0.120)
Leg. Sys. & Prop. Rights	0.176*** (0.053)		0.444 (0.304)	0.028 (0.264)
(log) Real GDP per capita		0.680*** (0.201)	-0.034 (0.598)	-0.273 (0.545)
Size of Government	-0.030 (0.054)	-0.090 (0.108)	0.139 (0.226)	-0.170 (0.183)
Access to Sound Money	-0.067 (0.058)	0.171 (0.110)	0.559*** (0.201)	-0.453 (0.282)
International Trade	0.143** (0.066)	0.086 (0.146)	-0.065 (0.403)	0.781** (0.359)
Regulation	0.018 (0.101)	0.381* (0.195)	-0.448 (0.427)	0.094 (0.348)
(log) 1500 GDP per capita	0.648* (0.380)	-0.477 (0.931)	-1.585 (2.369)	-1.368 (1.436)
Employment Share	1.475 (1.142)	0.556 (1.858)	-2.935 (4.354)	-1.195 (4.270)
(log) Population	-0.049 (0.058)	-0.113 (0.094)	-0.097 (0.264)	0.183 (0.251)
Human Capital	0.686*** (0.209)	-0.173 (0.289)	1.505** (0.669)	0.512 (0.694)
Observations	96	96	96	96
Adjusted R- squared	0.778	0.699		

Notes: *, **, *** indicates statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regional dummy variables also included, but not reported.

Table 7b: Regressions of 2012 income levels and institutional measures on assembly experience, with additional controls and “European-ness 1” control (European descendency share).

Year = 2012	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) Logit	(4) Logit
	Real GDP per capita	Legal System & Property Rights	Democracy	Checks & Balances
Assembly Experience	-0.021 (0.045)	0.208** (0.086)	0.982 (0.684)	-0.045 (0.350)
European-ness 1	0.028 (0.259)	-0.387 (0.569)	-0.054 (1.873)	-0.636 (1.736)
Checks & Balances	-0.035 (0.060)	-0.085 (0.145)	1.068*** (0.313)	
Democracy	-0.029 (0.033)	0.130* (0.074)		0.540*** (0.165)
Leg. Sys. & Prop. Rights	0.132** (0.054)		0.771*** (0.232)	-0.237 (0.325)
(log) Real GDP per capita		0.603** (0.255)	-0.052 (0.491)	-0.175 (0.547)
Size of Government	-0.108** (0.053)	-0.130 (0.115)	0.394 (0.246)	-0.757*** (0.256)
Access to Sound Money	0.045 (0.056)	0.102 (0.139)	0.924*** (0.176)	-0.952*** (0.265)
International Trade	0.020 (0.062)	0.124 (0.157)	0.228 (0.312)	0.892** (0.396)
Regulation	0.006 (0.110)	0.451** (0.208)	-1.480*** (0.441)	1.161*** (0.365)
1500 GDP per capita	0.623* (0.325)	0.602 (1.083)	-5.722 (4.403)	0.559 (2.108)
Employment Share	0.472 (1.018)	1.885 (1.826)	-3.996 (3.584)	-2.513 (3.884)
(log) Population	-0.072 (0.055)	-0.172* (0.099)	-0.329 (0.234)	0.574** (0.271)
Human Capital	0.872*** (0.174)	0.142 (0.367)	0.594 (0.663)	0.965 (0.710)
Observations	93	93	93	93
Adjusted R-squared	0.802	0.687		

Notes: *, **, *** indicates statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regional dummy variables also included, but not reported.

Table 8a: Regressions of 2005 income levels and institutional measures on assembly experience, with additional controls and “European-ness 2” control (1500 income weighted by European descendency).

Year = 2005	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) Logit	(4) Logit
	Real GDP per capita	Legal System & Property Rights	Democracy	Checks & Balances
Assembly Experience	-0.021 (0.049)	0.210* (0.112)	1.408 (0.889)	-0.078 (0.203)
European-ness 2	0.013 (0.041)	-0.026 (0.095)	-0.193 (0.308)	0.059 (0.221)
Checks & Balances	-0.042 (0.058)	0.042 (0.115)	0.366 (0.237)	
Democracy	0.001 (0.042)	0.061 (0.076)		0.288** (0.120)
Leg. Sys. & Prop. Rights	0.176*** (0.053)		0.442 (0.304)	0.027 (0.264)
(log) Real GDP per capita		0.681*** (0.201)	-0.030 (0.597)	-0.272 (0.545)
Size of Government	-0.030 (0.054)	-0.090 (0.108)	0.143 (0.227)	-0.171 (0.184)
Access to Sound Money	-0.066 (0.058)	0.171 (0.110)	0.559*** (0.201)	-0.453 (0.282)
International Trade	0.143** (0.066)	0.086 (0.146)	-0.065 (0.403)	0.782** (0.359)
Regulation	0.018 (0.101)	0.381* (0.194)	-0.451 (0.427)	0.095 (0.349)
(log) 1500 GDP per capita	0.641* (0.381)	-0.472 (0.930)	-1.569 (2.392)	-1.383 (1.476)
Employment Share	1.475 (1.142)	0.549 (1.856)	-3.020 (4.350)	-1.174 (4.271)
(log) Population	-0.049 (0.058)	-0.114 (0.094)	-0.100 (0.264)	0.185 (0.251)
Human Capital	0.687*** (0.209)	-0.173 (0.289)	1.500** (0.672)	0.510 (0.695)
Observations	96	96	96	96
Adjusted R-squared	0.778	0.699		

Notes: *, **, *** indicates statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regional dummy variables also included, but not reported.

Table 8b: Regressions of 2012 income levels and institutional measures on assembly experience, with additional controls and “European-ness 2” (1500 income weighted by European descendency).

Year = 2012	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) Logit	(4) Logit
	Real GDP per capita	Legal System & Property Rights	Democracy	Checks & Balances
Assembly Experience	-0.022 (0.046)	0.211** (0.087)	0.947 (0.673)	-0.052 (0.348)
European-ness 2	0.006 (0.041)	-0.062 (0.088)	0.016 (0.293)	-0.090 (0.275)
Checks & Balances	-0.034 (0.060)	-0.085 (0.145)	1.069*** (0.312)	
Democracy	-0.029 (0.033)	0.130* (0.074)		0.540*** (0.164)
Leg. Sys. & Prop. Rights	0.132** (0.054)		0.772*** (0.233)	-0.237 (0.325)
(log) Real GDP per capita		0.603** (0.255)	-0.054 (0.490)	-0.176 (0.546)
Size of Government	-0.107** (0.053)	-0.131 (0.115)	0.396 (0.245)	-0.757*** (0.256)
Access to Sound Money	0.045 (0.056)	0.102 (0.140)	0.922*** (0.175)	-0.953*** (0.265)
International Trade	0.020 (0.062)	0.124 (0.156)	0.230 (0.311)	0.893** (0.397)
Regulation	0.006 (0.110)	0.450** (0.207)	-1.479*** (0.441)	1.159*** (0.365)
(log) 1500 GDP per capita	0.618* (0.332)	0.631 (1.082)	-5.771 (4.459)	0.589 (2.171)
Employment Share	0.471 (1.017)	1.883 (1.824)	-4.056 (3.586)	-2.534 (3.885)
(log) Population	-0.072 (0.055)	-0.172* (0.099)	-0.332 (0.235)	0.572** (0.269)
Human Capital	0.872*** (0.174)	0.141 (0.367)	0.588 (0.665)	0.964 (0.710)
Observations	93	93	93	93
Adjusted R-squared	0.802	0.687		

Notes: *, **, *** indicates statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regional dummy variables also included, but not reported.

Table 9a: Regressions of 2005 income levels and institutional measures on assembly experience, with additional controls and without countries with 0 European assembly experience.

Year = 2005	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) Logit	(4) Logit
	Real GDP per capita	Legal System & Property Rights	Democracy	Checks & Balances
Assembly Experience	-0.043 (0.056)	0.233** (0.108)	1.382*** (0.497)	-0.052 (0.226)
Checks & Balances	-0.023 (0.066)	0.011 (0.123)	-0.130 (0.315)	
Democracy	0.046 (0.091)	0.065 (0.133)		0.092 (0.292)
Leg. Sys. & Prop. Rights	0.178*** (0.062)		0.604 (0.556)	-0.135 (0.301)
(log) Real GDP per capita		0.709** (0.349)	0.509 (1.212)	-0.199 (0.819)
Size of Government	-0.028 (0.064)	-0.042 (0.139)	0.326 (0.337)	-0.176 (0.231)
Access to Sound Money	-0.042 (0.078)	0.059 (0.157)	0.734** (0.351)	-0.022 (0.362)
International Trade	0.006 (0.130)	0.286 (0.265)	0.024 (0.682)	0.884 (0.571)
Regulation	0.041 (0.130)	0.515 (0.324)	-1.142** (0.576)	-0.109 (0.500)
(log) 1500 GDP per capita	1.256*** (0.455)	-0.646 (1.316)	0.317 (4.104)	-2.224 (1.982)
Employment Share	0.066 (1.609)	2.254 (3.343)	-0.023 (7.829)	7.948 (5.846)
(log) Population	0.002 (0.075)	-0.123 (0.118)	-0.354 (0.401)	0.233 (0.284)
Human Capital	0.639** (0.291)	-0.644 (0.492)	1.911 (1.311)	0.547 (1.036)
Observations	61	61	61	61
Adjusted R-squared	0.733	0.736		

Notes: *, **, *** indicates statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regional dummy variables also included, but not reported.

Table 9b: Regressions of 2012 income levels and institutional measures on assembly experience, with additional controls and without countries with 0 European assembly experience.

Year = 2012	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) Logit	(4) Logit
	Real GDP per capita	Legal System & Property Rights	Democracy	Checks & Balances
Assembly Experience	-0.073* (0.043)	0.226** (0.098)	1.537** (0.773)	-0.246 (0.255)
Checks & Balances	-0.069 (0.050)	-0.099 (0.131)	1.020*** (0.370)	
Democracy	0.005 (0.038)	0.157 (0.101)		0.656*** (0.224)
Leg. Sys. & Prop. Rights	0.200*** (0.067)		0.811*** (0.271)	-0.370 (0.413)
(log) Real GDP per capita		1.167*** (0.383)	0.602 (0.914)	-0.905 (0.747)
Size of Government	-0.104 (0.063)	-0.147 (0.126)	0.669** (0.306)	-1.059*** (0.299)
Access to Sound Money	0.141* (0.071)	-0.265* (0.149)	0.781*** (0.294)	-0.644* (0.338)
International Trade	-0.208*** (0.077)	0.679*** (0.190)	0.559 (0.432)	0.739 (0.537)
Regulation	-0.131 (0.140)	0.506 (0.317)	-1.116 (0.717)	0.714 (0.624)
(log) 1500 GDP per capita	1.022*** (0.283)	-0.797 (1.144)	-5.657 (3.930)	2.305 (2.404)
Employment Share	-0.612 (1.121)	2.430 (3.052)	0.622 (5.279)	4.772 (4.848)
(log) Population	-0.032 (0.060)	-0.149 (0.126)	-0.359 (0.332)	0.422 (0.364)
Human Capital	1.036*** (0.184)	-1.025 (0.653)	0.138 (1.408)	1.611 (1.151)
Observations	59	59	59	59
Adjusted R-squared	0.840	0.785		

Notes: *, **, *** indicates statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regional dummy variables also included, but not reported.

Table 10a: Summary statistics for select variables: 15 Stasavage countries versus non-Stasavage countries.

Variable (15 Stasavage Countries)	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Assembly Experience	15	3.4633	2.154	0.027	6.681
Year = 2005					
Checks & Balances	15	4	0.845	3	6
Democracy	15	9.667	1.047	6	10
Legal System & Property Rights	15	7.844	1.501	4.511	9.461
Year = 2012					
Checks & Balances	15	4	1.254	2	6
Democracy	15	9.467	1.356	5	10
Legal System & Property Rights	15	7.557	1.309	4.430	9.140
Variable (non-Stasavage Countries)	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Assembly Experience	150	0.327	0.803	0	4.975
Year = 2005					
Checks & Balances	146	2.671	1.420	1	6
Democracy	135	5.119	3.877	0	10
Legal System & Property Rights	105	5.554	1.936	1.423	9.318
Year = 2012					
Checks & Balances	142	2.768	1.491	1	9
Democracy	137	5.482	3.750	0	10
Legal System & Property Rights	105	5.556	1.845	1.302	9.178

Table 10b: Summary statistics for select variables: European countries versus non-European countries.

Variable (European)	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Assembly Experience	36	1.497	2.169	0	6.681
Year = 2005					
Checks & Balances	34	3.971	1.167	2	6
Democracy	32	9.344	1.789	0	10
Legal System & Property Rights	30	7.599	1.382	4.844	9.461
Year = 2012					
Checks & Balances	32	4.125	1.409	2	8
Democracy	34	9.265	1.746	0	10
Legal System & Property Rights	30	7.365	1.332	4.841	9.148
Variable (non-European)	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Assembly Experience	129	0.365	0.859	0	4.975
Year = 2005					
Checks & Balances	127	2.480	1.326	1	5
Democracy	118	4.551	3.734	0	10
Legal System & Property Rights	90	5.254	1.903	1.423	9.271
Year = 2012					
Checks & Balances	125	2.568	1.370	1	9
Democracy	118	4.898	3.638	0	10
Legal System & Property Rights	90	5.286	1.779	1.302	9.178

Notes: European and non-European distinction made according to CIA World Factbook. See <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2145.html> for details.

APPENDIX: Estimations controlling for “European-ness” without additional controls or regional dummies.

Table A1: Regressions of income levels and institutional measures on assembly experience and “European-ness 1” control (European descendency share).

Year = 2005	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) Logit	(4) Logit
	Real GDP per capita	Legal System & Property Rights	Democracy	Checks & Balances
Assembly Experience	0.177*** (0.051)	0.643*** (0.207)	0.939*** (0.333)	0.053 (0.151)
“European-ness 1”	1.058*** (0.306)	-0.404 (1.084)	1.320 (0.949)	2.018*** (0.650)
Observations	155	119	150	159
Adjusted R-squared	0.191	0.168		
2012	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) Logit	(4) Logit
	Real GDP per capita	Legal System & Property Rights	Democracy	Checks & Balances
Assembly Experience	0.116*** (0.041)	0.621*** (0.183)	0.680** (0.312)	0.082 (0.226)
“European-ness” 1	1.189*** (0.263)	-0.624 (0.977)	1.474 (1.011)	1.471 (1.094)
Observations	155	119	152	155
Adjusted R-squared	0.174	0.154		

Notes: *, **, *** indicates statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table A2: Regressions of income levels and institutional measures on assembly experience and “European-ness 2” control (1500 income weighted by European descendency).

Year = 2005	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) Logit	(4) Logit
	Real GDP per capita	Legal System & Property Rights	Democracy	Checks & Balances
Assembly Experience	0.173*** (0.052)	0.644*** (0.213)	0.930*** (0.334)	0.052 (0.152)
“European-ness” 2	0.165*** (0.047)	-0.062 (0.170)	0.205 (0.147)	0.309*** (0.103)
Observations	155	119	150	159
Adjusted R-squared	0.191	0.168		
Year = 2012	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) Logit	(4) Logit
	Real GDP per capita	Legal System & Property Rights	Democracy	Checks & Balances
Assembly Experience	0.113*** (0.042)	0.623*** (0.188)	0.680** (0.308)	0.070 (0.224)
“European-ness” 2	0.184*** (0.040)	-0.097 (0.153)	0.225 (0.154)	0.234 (0.166)
Observations	155	119	152	155
Adjusted R-squared	0.174	0.154		

Notes: *, **, *** indicates statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table A3a: Regressions of income levels and institutional measures on assembly experience with additional controls (not reported) but excluding countries that fall within the top 5% of the "European-ness 1".

Year = 2005	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) Logit	(4) Logit
	Real GDP per capita	Legal System & Property Rights	Democracy	Checks & Balances
Assembly Experience	-0.036 (0.036)	0.254*** (0.070)	0.957*** (0.353)	-0.024 (0.198)
Observations	89	89	89	89
Adjusted R-Squared	0.772	0.698		
Year = 2012	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) Logit	(4) Logit
	Real GDP per capita	Legal System & Property Rights	Democracy	Checks & Balances
Assembly Experience	-0.029 (0.034)	0.173** (0.072)	1.424*** (0.471)	-0.083 (0.323)
Observations	86	86	86	86
Adjusted R-Squared	0.797	0.675		

Notes: *, **, *** indicates statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table A3b: Regressions of income levels and institutional measures on assembly experience with additional controls (not reported) but excluding countries that fall within the top 10% of the "European-ness 1" control.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Year = 2005	OLS	OLS	Logit	Logit
	Real GDP per capita	Legal System & Property Rights	Democracy	Checks & Balances
Assembly Experience	-0.007 (0.092)	0.298 (0.179)	0.719 (0.769)	0.035 (0.443)
Observations	79	79	79	79
Adjusted R-Squared	0.738	0.632		
Year = 2012	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) Logit	(4) Logit
	Real GDP per capita	Legal System & Property Rights	Democracy	Checks & Balances
Assembly Experience	0.042 (0.098)	0.265 (0.220)	2.073* (1.157)	-0.472 (0.777)
Observations	76	76	76	76
Adjusted R-Squared	0.775	0.611		

Notes: *, **, *** indicates statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table A3c: Regressions of income levels and institutional measures on assembly experience with additional controls (not reported) but excluding countries that fall within the top 18% of the "European-ness" control 1.

	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) Logit	(4) Logit
Year = 2005	Real GDP per capita	Legal System & Property Rights	Democracy	Checks & Balances
Assembly Experience	0.167 (0.370)	0.535 (0.581)	1.649* (0.991)	-1.395 (1.386)
Observations	74	74	74	74
Adjusted R-Squared	0.713	0.574		
	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) Logit	(4) Logit
Year = 2012	Real GDP per capita	Legal System & Property Rights	Democracy	Checks & Balances
Assembly Experience	0.163 (0.336)	0.289 (0.638)	2.073* (1.157)	-0.541 (2.375)
Observations	72	72	72	72
Adjusted R-Squared	0.761	0.553		

Notes: *, **, *** indicates statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses.