LWP

2014
Margaret Thatcher, the Thatcherite Intellectuals, and the Fate of Keynes
John Trumpbour. 5/2014. “Margaret Thatcher, the Thatcherite Intellectuals, and the Fate of Keynes.” Industrial Relations Journal, Special Issue on Margaret Thatcher’s Legacy, 45:3, Pp. 250-265. Publisher's VersionAbstract
In the early 1970s, major political leaders of the centre-right such as Richard M. Nixon proudly declared their allegiance to the Keynesian consensus and the welfare state. By the mid-1970s, this consensus unravelled so rapidly that even the leader of Britain's Labour Party came to regard Keynesian medicine as ineffectual. Seeking to demolish several foundations of the Keynesian welfare state, Thatcherism soon attracted economists and policy pundits eager to defend its achievements, including in North America at such bygone hotbeds of Keynesianism as Harvard University. This essay seeks to probe cherished mythologies of Thatcherism that she restored Britain's economic dynamism, streamlined government and revived plucky entrepreneurship. Her intellectual admirers have largely averted their eyes from law-and-order repression and the rewards delivered to politically connected insiders, most dramatically those policies unleashing finance capitalists and extending the tentacles of the Murdoch media empire.
Falling Behind? Boom, Bust, and the Global Race for Scientific Talent
Michael S. Teitelbaum. 2014. Falling Behind? Boom, Bust, and the Global Race for Scientific Talent . Princeton University Press.Abstract

Is the United States falling behind in the global race for scientific and engineering talent? Are U.S. employers facing shortages of the skilled workers that they need to compete in a globalized world? Such claims from some employers and educators have been widely embraced by mainstream media and political leaders, and have figured prominently in recent policy debates about education, federal expenditures, tax policy, and immigration. Falling Behind? offers careful examinations of the existing evidence and of its use by those involved in these debates.

These concerns are by no means a recent phenomenon. Examining historical precedent, Michael Teitelbaum highlights five episodes of alarm about "falling behind" that go back nearly seventy years to the end of World War II. In each of these episodes the political system responded by rapidly expanding the supply of scientists and engineers, but only a few years later political enthusiasm or economic demand waned. Booms turned to busts, leaving many of those who had been encouraged to pursue science and engineering careers facing disheartening career prospects. Their experiences deterred younger and equally talented students from following in their footsteps—thereby sowing the seeds of the next cycle of alarm, boom, and bust.

Falling Behind? examines these repeated cycles up to the present, shedding new light on the adequacy of the science and engineering workforce for the current and future needs of the United States.

Benjamin I. Sachs and Catherine L. Fisk. 2014. “Restoring Equity in Right-to-Work Law.” U.C. Irvine Law Revue, Vol. 4, 2, Pp. 857-879. Publisher's VersionAbstract
Under United States labor law, when a majority of employees in a bargaining unit chooses union representation, all employees in the unit are represented by the union. Federal law, moreover, requires the union to represent all workers in a bargaining unit equally with respect to both collective bargaining and disciplinary matters. As a general rule, federal law enables unions to require employees to pay for the services that unions are obligated to provide them. Twenty-four states, however, have enacted laws granting union-represented employees the right to refuse to pay the union for the services that federal law requires the union to offer. As such, the intersection of federal labor law and state right to work laws results in a mandate that unions provide services for free to any employee who declines to pay dues. This paper proposes three approaches to addressing this feature of U.S. labor law. First, the paper argues that under a proper reading of the NLRA states may not prohibit all mandatory payments from workers to unions. In particular, the paper shows that states must permit collective bargaining agreements requiring so-called objectors (or nonmembers) to pay dues and fees lower than those required of members. Second, the paper argues that in right to work states federal law ought to relax the requirement of exclusive representation and allow unions to organize, bargain on behalf of, and represent only those workers who affirmatively choose to become members. This proposal would implement a members-only bargaining regime in right to work states. Third, the paper contends that the NLRB ought to abandon its rule forbidding unions from charging objecting nonmembers a fee for representation services that the union provides directly and individually to them.
2013
Benjamin I. Sachs. 9/2/2013. “A New Kind of Union.” New York Times, Pp. A17. Publisher's Version
The Citizen's Share: Putting Ownership Back into Democracy
Richard B. Freeman, Joseph R. Blasi, and Douglas Kruse. 2013. The Citizen's Share: Putting Ownership Back into Democracy. Yale University Press.
The Unbundled Union: Politics Without Collective Bargaining
Benjamin I. Sachs. 2013. “The Unbundled Union: Politics Without Collective Bargaining.” Yale Law Journal, Vol. 123, Pp. 148-207. Publisher's VersionAbstract
Public policy in the United States is disproportionately responsive to the wealthy, and the traditional response to this problem, campaign finance regulation, has failed. As students of politics have long recognized, however, political influence flows not only from wealth but also from organization, a form of political power open to all income groups. Accordingly, as this Essay argues, a promising alternative to campaign finance regulations is legal interventions designed to facilitate political organizing by the poor and middle class. To date, the most important legal intervention of this kind has been labor law, and the labor union has been the central vehicle for this type of organizing. But the labor union as a political-organizational vehicle suffers a fundamental flaw: unions bundle political organization with collective bargaining, a highly contested form of economic organization. As a result, opposition to collective bargaining impedes unions' ability to serve as a political-organizing vehicle for lower and middle-income groups. Public policy in the United States is disproportionately responsive to the wealthy, and the traditional response to this problem, campaign finance regulation, has failed. As students of politics have long recognized, however, political influence flows not only from wealth but also from organization, a form of political power open to all income groups. Accordingly, as this Essay argues, a promising alternative to campaign finance regulations is legal interventions designed to facilitate political organizing by the poor and middle class. To date, the most important legal intervention of this kind has been labor law, and the labor union has been the central vehicle for this type of organizing. But the labor union as a political-organizational vehicle suffers a fundamental flaw: unions bundle political organization with collective bargaining, a highly contested form of economic organization. As a result, opposition to collective bargaining impedes unions' ability to serve as a political-organizing vehicle for lower and middle-income groups. This Essay proposes that labor law unbundle the union, allowing employees to organize politically through the union form without also organizing economically for collective bargaining purposes. Doing so would have the immediate effect of liberating political-organizational efforts from the constraints of collective bargaining, an outcome that could mitigate representational inequality. The Essay identifies the legal reforms that would be necessary to enable such unbundled "political unions" to succeed. It concludes by looking beyond the union context and suggesting a broader regime of reforms aimed at facilitating political organizing by those income groups for whom representational inequality is now a problem.
2012
What Happened to Shared Prosperity and Full Employment and How to Get Them Back: a Seussian Perspective
Richard B. Freema. 11/12/2012. “What Happened to Shared Prosperity and Full Employment and How to Get Them Back: a Seussian Perspective.” In Reconnecting to Work -- Policies to Mitigate Long-Term Unemployment and Its Consequences , edited by Lauren D. Appelbaum, Pp. vii-xviii Foreword. W.E. Upjohn Institute. Publisher's Version
Richard B. Freeman and Marit Rehavi. 2012. How the Internet is Changing the Activity of Union Representatives in the UK: A study of www.unionreps.org.uk.
Benjamin I. Sachs. 2012. “Unions, Corporations, and Political Opt-Out Rights after Citizens United.” Columbia Law Review , Vol. 112, Pp. 800-869. J-stor linkAbstract
Citizens United upends much of campaign finance law, but it maintains at least one feature of that legal regime: the equal treatment of corporations and unions. Prior to Citizens United, that is, corporations and unions were equally constrained in their ability to spend general treasury funds on federal electoral politics. After the decision, campaign finance law leaves both equally unconstrained and free to use their general treasuries to finance political expenditures. But the symmetrical treatment that Citizens United leaves in place masks a less visible, but equally significant, way in which the law treats union and corporate political spending differently. Namely, federal law prohibits a union from spending its general treasury funds on politics if individual employees object to such use - employees, in short, enjoy a federally protected right to opt out of funding union political activity. In contrast, corporations are free to spend their general treasuries on politics even if individual shareholders object - shareholders enjoy no right to opt out of financing corporate political activity. This Article assesses whether the asymmetric rule of political opt-out rights is justified. The Article first offers an affirmative case for symmetry grounded in the principle that the power to control access to economic opportunities - whether employment or investment based - should not be used to secure compliance with or support for the economic actor's political agenda. It then addresses three arguments in favor of asymmetry. Given the relative weakness of these arguments, the Article suggests that the current asymmetry in opt-out rules may be unjustified. The Article concludes by pointing to constitutional questions raised by this asymmetry, and by arguing that lawmakers would be justified in correcting it.
2010
Richard B. Freeman. 5/26/2010. “IT'S FINANCIALIZATION!” International Labour Review,, Vol. 149, 2. PDF Version
Labor in the Information Age
John Trumpbour. 2/2010. “Labor in the Information Age.” a special issue of Labor History, vol. 51, 1. Publisher's Version
 "Enabling Employee Choice: A Structural Approach to the Rules of Union Organizing,"
Benjamin I. Sachs. 2010. “ "Enabling Employee Choice: A Structural Approach to the Rules of Union Organizing,"” HARVARD LAW REVIEW, Vol. 123, Pp. 655-727. Publisher's VersionAbstract
The proposed Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA) has led to fierce debate over how best
to ensure employees a choice on the question of unionization. The debate goes to the
core of our federal system of labor law. Each of the potential legislative designs under
consideration — including both “card check” and “rapid elections” — aims to enhance
employee choice by minimizing or eliminating managerial involvement in the
unionization process. The central question raised by EFCA, therefore, is whether
enabling employees to limit or avoid managerial intervention in union campaigns is an
appropriate goal for federal law. This Article answers this foundational question in the
affirmative. It reaches this conclusion by conceptualizing federal labor law in terms of
legal default rules, drawing in particular on the preference-eliciting default theory of
statutory interpretation and the reversible default theory from corporate law. Doing so
leads to the argument that card check, rapid elections, and similar mechanisms are best
understood as “asymmetry-correcting altering rules” — means of mitigating the
impediments that block departure from the nonunion default. Understanding EFCA in
this way also requires that we ask how such an altering rule should be constructed. This
Article addresses this institutional design question by arguing that card check’s open
decisionmaking process is flawed and that rapid elections, while an improvement over
the status quo, are an insufficient method of mitigating the relevant impediments to
employee choice. Accordingly, this Article offers two new designs — alternatives to both
card check and rapid elections — that would accomplish the legitimate function
of minimizing managerial intervention while at the same time preserving secrecy in
decisionmaking. 
Elaine Bernard. 2010. “Recipe for Anarchy: B.C. Tel Occupation of 1981.” In Workers, Capital, and the State in British Columbia: Selected Papers edited by Rennie Warburton and David Coburn. University of British Columbia Press. PDF Version
2009
Card Check 2.0: A better fix for union organizing than the Employee Free Choice Act
Benjamin I. Sachs. 4/16/2009. “Card Check 2.0: A better fix for union organizing than the Employee Free Choice Act.” Slate Internet Magazine. Publisher's Version
Elaine Bernard. 2009. “Unions: Schools for Democracy.” Democratic Left, the online publication of the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA),. PDF Version
2008
Benjamine I. Sachs. 2008. “Employment Law as Labor Law.” Cardozo Law Review, vol. 29:6, Pp. 2685-2748. Publisher's Version
Hollywood and the World: Export or Die
John Trumpbour. 2008. “Hollywood and the World: Export or Die.” In The Contemporary Hollywood Film Industry , edited by Paul McDonald and Janet Wasko. Malden, MA and Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
Why Do We Work More than Keynes Expected?
Richard B. Freeman. 2008. “Why Do We Work More than Keynes Expected?” In Revisiting Keynes: Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren, edited by Lorenzo Pecchi and Gustavo Piga. Vol. Chapter 9. Cambridge: MIT Press.
2007
China: Banking Reform and Economic Development Revisited
John Trumpbour. 9/13/2007. “China: Banking Reform and Economic Development Revisited.” GT News. Publisher's Version
Reprinted in October 2008 at IDEAs Network (International Development Economics Associates),
What Workers Say: Employee Voice in the Anglo-american Workplace.
7/2007. What Workers Say: Employee Voice in the Anglo-american Workplace., Pp. 256. ILR Press.

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